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Abstract 
The presence of another person can influence task performance. What is, however, still 
unclear is whether performance also depends on what this other person is doing. In two experiments, 
two participants (A and B) jointly performed a Simon task, and we selectively manipulated the 
difficulty of the task for participant A only. This was achieved by presenting A with 90% congruent 
trials (creating an easy task requiring low effort investment) or 10% congruent trials (creating a 
difficult task requiring high effort investment). Although this manipulation is irrelevant for the task of 
participant B, we nevertheless observed that B exerted more mental effort when participant A 
performed the difficult version of the task, compared to the easy version. Crucially, in Experiment 2 
this was found to be the case even when participants could not see each other’s stimuli. These 
results provide a first compelling demonstration that the exertion of effort is contagious. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, an increasing number of people perform their daily working duties in the 
presence of others, for example in open landscape offices. The introduction of these landscape desks 
is often met with critique, arguing that it hampers efficient work, due to an overflow of potential 
sources of distraction. This raises a straightforward empirical question: What is the influence of co-
workers on our task performance?  
According to Social Facilitation Theory (Zajonc, 1965), the presence of another person 
facilitates the execution of dominant responses, which are those behaviors that are highly 
overlearned and executed without deliberate cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). The presence of another person thus makes it easier to execute a dominant response 
when it is appropriate, but harder to overcome it when this is not the case (see Baron, 1986 for a 
different interpretation). More specifically, performance on a simple, low-level motor task improves 
in the presence of observers (Travis, 1925), whereas performance on a difficult test-battery assessing 
executive functioning worsens in the presence of a third-party observer (Horwitz & McCaffrey, 2008; 
for a seminal meta-analysis, see Bond & Titus, 1983). In line with this, recent studies have shown that 
performance on a conflict task assessing executive functioning decreases in the presence of others 
who are executing the same task (Huguet, Barbet, Belletier, Monteil, & Fagot, 2014), suggesting that 
the presence of these others taxes our cognitive control capacity (see also Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, 
George, & Huguet, 2010).  
As described above, social facilitation theory only deals with explaining how the presence of 
another person influences performance, but it does not address action-specific influences of others. 
As a result, most studies to date investigating the influence of social presence on cognitive control 
have compared the mere presence versus absence of another person. Contrarily, ideomotor theories 
(James, 1890; Jeannerod, 1999) predict that our behavior is highly dependent on actions that we 
observe in other people (for empirical demonstrations, see e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Iacoboni 
et al., 1999; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). Building on this notion, we aimed to examine whether 
task performance depends not simply on the presence of another person, but rather on the degree 
of mental effort that this other person is exerting. Thus, it is examined whether the exertion of 
mental effort is contagious. To accomplish this, participants performed a task together with another 
person, and task difficulty was selectively manipulated for the other participant: the more difficult 
the task, the more effort this other person needs to invest to obtain good task performance 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). By doing so, we can examine whether 
task performance is influenced by the other persons’ exerted degree of effort. If task performance 
improves when the other person invests more effort, this would be indicative of increased effort 
exertion and thus demonstrate the contagious nature of effort exertion.  
To investigate this, we adopted a variant of the Simon task in which two persons jointly 
perform the task. In a regular Simon task, one participant responds to the color of patches (e.g., blue 
or red) with either the left or the right hand, while ignoring its location on the screen (i.e., left or 
right). Typically, reaction times (RTs) are shorter and error rates lower on congruent trials, where the 
(task irrelevant) location triggers the same response as the (task relevant) color, compared to 
incongruent trials, where both features trigger a different response (i.e., the congruency effect). Here, 
two participants (A and B) are seated next to each other and each responds to half of the stimuli. For 
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example, A responds to blue stimuli, whereas B responds to red stimuli. Although this is in essence a 
simple (joint) Go/No-Go task, it nevertheless produces robust congruency effects for both 
participants (Sebanz et al., 2003). The typical approach is to compare the congruency effect in this 
Joint Simon task to the congruency effect obtained in a condition in which participants perform the 
same task without the presence of another person (i.e., individual Go/No-Go). In the current study, 
we adopted a novel approach and used a within-participant comparison. We varied the difficulty of 
participant A by selectively manipulating his or her proportion of congruent trials. More specifically, 
this participant either performs a difficult version of the task, (i.e., 10% congruent trials) or an easy 
version of the task (i.e., 90% congruent trials). In line with the typical findings obtained with the 
regular Simon task, we expect that the congruency effect of participant A will be large in the 90% 
congruent condition, while it will be severely reduced in the 10% congruent condition (Logan & 
Zbrodoff, 1979). This pattern is typically explained by assuming that participants do not exert control 
in the 90% congruent condition and thus do not suppress the location information, because this 
information is helpful on the majority of trials. This strategy is beneficial for congruent trials, but not 
for the few incongruent trials, leading to large congruency effects. In the 10% congruent condition, 
on the other hand, it is assumed that participants increase their level of control in order to handle 
the now interfering location information. In this case, this strategy is beneficial for incongruent trials, 
but it reduces the beneficial effect of location on the infrequent congruent trials, leading to reduced 
congruency effects. The difference between these two conditions is believed to reflect the larger 
investment of cognitive control in the latter condition (Botvinick et al., 2001). Crucially, our design 
allows us to examine whether task performance of participant B, who always receives 50% congruent 
trials, is dependent on the task difficulty and thus effort exertion of participant A. If the exertion of 
mental effort is contagious, the results of participant B should mimic those of participant A: the 
congruency effect of participant B should be smaller when participant A performs a difficult task, 
compared to an easy task.  
Below, we report the results of two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants jointly 
perform half of a Simon task (i.e., a joint Go/No-Go; Experiment 1; see Figure 1a) on the same screen. 
In Experiment 2, participants only had visual access to their own stimuli and thus individually perform 
half of a Simon task, while seated next to each other (i.e., individual Go/No-Go, Experiment 2; see 
Figure 1b).  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-eight participants (20 females) participated on a voluntary basis or in return for course 
credit, and provided written informed consent. The sample size was determined beforehand (aimed 
at 40, with only 38 showing up) based on our experience with conflict studies. All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had normal color vision and were naive with 
respect to the hypothesis. Mean age of the sample was 21.6 years (range 17-30, SD = 2.1).    
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was programmed in E-prime for Windows (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) and run on Intel Pentium 4 computers with 17inch LCD screens. The refresh rate was 
set to 60 Hz. Targets were four color patches (3.5° wide and 3.5° high) in blue (RGB 0, 0, 255), yellow 
(RGB 255, 242, 0) green (RGB 34, 177, 76) or orange (RGB 255, 127, 39). 
Procedure 
Participants performed the experiment in pairs, seated next to each other in front of a 
computer screen (see Figure 1A). They were instructed that they were to perform a task on the same 
AZERTY keyboard and that each of them had to respond with one hand to two of the four colors. 
Participants were not informed that the difficulty of the task would vary over the different blocks The 
left participant responded to two colors with the left hand by pressing the “d” key, the right 
participant responded to the two other colors with the right hand by pressing the “k” key (with all 
color combinations counterbalanced across participants). Each trial started with a centrally 
presented fixation cross lasting 800ms, followed by a color patch, which was presented either on the 
left or right side of the screen (at 25% or 75% of the screen border) and disappeared when a 
response was made or after 3000ms. The inter-trial interval lasted for 1000ms. The experiment 
started with 16 practice trials, where feedback was presented when an error was committed, 
followed by four blocks of 160 trials each in which feedback was no longer provided, with self-paced 
breaks after every 80 trials.  
 
Design 
Figure 1C shows a graphical representation of the design. Within the first two blocks, the 
proportion of congruent trials of one participant was manipulated. This participant received 90% 
congruent trials (i.e., low effort condition) in the first block and 10% congruent trials (i.e., high effort 
condition) in the second block (order counterbalanced across participants), while the other 
participant received an equal proportion of congruent and incongruent trials. Within the last two 
blocks, the proportion of congruent trials was manipulated for the other participant (i.e., 90% 
congruent trials in block 3 and 10% congruent trials in block four). Note that the manipulated 
proportion of congruent trials in block 2 was always different from the proportion of congruent trials 
of the other participant in block 3 (e.g., 10% to 90% or vice versa), in order to rule out any possible 
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carry-over effects from one’s own manipulation to the next block. This design allowed us to test 
whether the task difficult of one participant (90% vs. 10% congruent trials) influences the congruency 
effect of the other participant, who received an equal proportion of congruent and incongruent trials. 
  
 
Fig 1. Panel A shows the set-up of Experiment 1, in which two participants jointly perform a 
Simon task. Panel B shows the set-up of Experiment 2, in which a cardboard was placed in the middle 
of the screen, so participants could fully see each other but not each other’s stimuli. Note that the 
black dotted squares are used here to indicate all possible positions of the squares, but were not 
presented in the actual experiment. Panel C shows the design of both Experiments. Within the first 
two blocks, the proportion of congruent trials was manipulated in the stimulus list of the left 
participant, whereas the right participant received an equal proportion of congruent and incongruent 
trials. In blocks 3 and 4, the manipulation was swapped. Note that the order of the congruency 
manipulation was counterbalanced; see text for the exact details. 
 
Results 
To examine performance when the proportion of congruent trials was manipulated in the 
stimulus list of the other participant (see Figure 2), we submitted the median reaction times (RTs) of 
correct trials (98.7% of all trials) and mean error rates to a 2 (congruency: congruent or incongruent) 
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x 2 (proportion congruency of the other participant: 90% or 10% congruent trials) repeated measures 
analysis of variance.1  
RTs showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,37) = 25.85, p < .001, reflecting that on average 
responses were shorter on congruent trials (369ms) than on incongruent trials (381ms). Crucially, 
this main effect of congruency was modulated by the proportion congruency of the other participant, 
F(1,37) = 27.25, p < .001. The congruency effect of the participant receiving an equal amount of 
congruent and incongruent trials was 23ms when the other participant received 90% congruent trials, 
t(37) = 7.75, p < .001. This effect dropped to a non-significant 1ms, t(37) = 0.2, p = .81, when the 
other participant received only 10% congruent trials. This shows that participants were better in 
suppressing irrelevant location information (i.e., exerted more effort) when the participant next to 
him/her also exerted more effort. The main effect of proportion congruency of the other participant 
did not reach significance, F(1,37) = 1.45, p = .23, showing that these results do not reflect a speed-
accuracy trade-off.  
Error rates also showed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,37) = 7.91, p = .008, 
reflecting on average lower error rates on congruent trials (0.9%) compared to incongruent trials 
(1.6%). Mirroring the RTs, this congruency effect was modulated by the proportion congruency of the 
other participant, F(1,37) = 15.93, p < .001. When the other participant received 90% congruent trials, 
the congruency effect was 2.1%, t(37) = 4.41, p < .001, whereas it dropped to a non-significant -0.6%, 
t(37) = -1.5, p = .13, when the other participant received 10% congruent trials. The main effect of 
proportion congruency of the other participant did not reach significance, F < 1. 
For completeness, we also report the results when the proportion of congruent trials was 
manipulated in participant’s own stimulus list (see Table 1). RTs on correct trials (98.6% of all trials) 
showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,37) = 17.34, p < .001, which was modulated by the 
proportion of congruent trials, F(1,37) = 38.67, p < .001. Congruency effects were positive when 90% 
of the trials were congruent, 44ms, t(37) = 7.76, p < .001, and negative when 10% of the trials were 
congruent, -14ms, t(37) = -3.5, p = .001. The main effect of proportion congruency did not reach 
significance, p > .31, showing that overall response speed did not differ between both contexts. This 
rules out the possibility that the other participant simply adapted his or her behavior to the openly 
observable response speed. The error rates did not show differences between conditions, all p’s > .10. 
 
                                                          
1
 None of the variables that were counterbalanced had an impact on the results of either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2. Most importantly, the effect was not different for participants who first performed the 50/50 
proportion condition and participants who first performed the condition in which the congruency proportion 
was manipulated, Experiment 1: F < 1; Experiment 2: F < 1, thus, our results cannot be explained by potential 
carry-over effects. For both groups, we observed a significant interaction between congruency and the 
proportion congruency of the other participant, both for Experiment 1: 50/50 condition first: 18ms, t(18) = 3.24, 
pone-sided = .002, 50/50 condition second: 26ms, t(18) = 4.08, pone-sided < .001, and Experiment 2: 50/50 condition 
first: 12ms, t(18) = 1.94, pone-sided = .034; 50/50 condition second: 8 ms, t(18) = 1.61, pone-sided = .06. 
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Fig 2. Results of Experiment 1 for the blocks in which participants received an equal 
proportion of congruent and incongruent trials, dependent on the proportion congruency of the 
other participant. Error bars reflect 95% within-subjects confidence intervals.  
 
Interim Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we observed that participants showed reduced congruency effects 
(reflecting increased effort exertion to ignore the irrelevant location information) when the 
participant next to them performed a difficult task (i.e., 10% congruent trials, requiring much effort), 
compared to an easy task (i.e., 90% congruent trials, requiring little effort). Although promising, one 
issue deserves further attention. Participants performed the task in the presence of another person, 
while they could clearly see both their own stimuli as well as the other’s stimuli. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether they adapted their response strategy based on the degree of effort exerted by the 
person next to them, or simply based on the total number of congruent and incongruent trials2. This 
difference is of crucial importance, because the latter explanation implies that the presence of the 
other person is not an important factor. In order to rule out this interpretation, we created an 
experimental set-up that allowed us to unequivocally show that participants change their degree of 
effort exertion dependent on that of the participant next to them. Therefore, in Experiment 2 
participants could fully see each other, but had no visual access to each other’s stimuli. As a result, 
any transfer effect of our proportion congruency manipulation can only be attributed to participants 
being sensitive to the amount of effort exerted by the person next to them. 
 
                                                          
2
 Another factor which might have added to the findings of Experiment 1 is that the location of the stimulus 
was predictive of the response. For example, when participant A performs a block with 90% congruent trials, 
participant B has to respond to 83.33% of the stimuli appearing on his or her side (because 50% of the stimuli 
of participant B and only 10% of the stimuli of participant A appeared on that side). Note, however, that this 
confound is completely eliminated in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-eight participants (30 females) participated in return for course credit or 6€, and 
provided written informed consent. Sample size was based on that of Experiment 1. All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had normal color vision and were naive with 
respect to the hypothesis. Mean age of the sample was 20.8 years (range 18-27, SD = 2.1). None of 
them participated in Experiment 1.   
Apparatus, stimuli, and design 
The experiment was run on 21 inch LCD screens divided in two parts by means of a 
handcrafted cardboard screen. Target patches were 2.4° degrees wide and 1.9° high. Apart from that, 
apparatus, stimuli and design were identical to Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
In Experiment 2, we used a set-up in which participants could fully see each other, but only 
their own stimuli. As can be seen Figure 1B, this was achieved by means of a cardboard screen which 
separated the monitor in two parts. As in Experiment 1, participants performed their task on the 
same keyboard, which was clearly visible for both of them. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, the 
stimuli were now presented for each participant separately on his or her space of the screen. On 
each trial, a fixation cross was presented centrally on each half of the screen, which was followed by 
a color patch that appeared only on the (left or right) side of the space on the screen of the 
participant who was assigned to that color (i.e., at 10% or 40% of the entire screen border for the 
participant on the left and at 60% or 90% of the entire screen border for the participant on the right). 
For example, if the person on the left responds to blue and orange, all blue and orange stimuli 
appeared only on his or her space of the screen. For the 50% condition, 50% of the time on the left 
side of their space (i.e., congruent) and 50% of the time on the right side of their space (i.e., 
incongruent). On these trials, the other participant is presented with a blank screen. For the 10% 
condition, the blue and orange stimuli appear in the following proportions: 10% of the time on the 
left side of their space and 90% of the time on the right side of their space. For the 90% condition, 
the reverse is true: 90% of the time on the right and 10% of the time on the left. Apart from this, the 
procedure was identical to Experiment 1.  
 
Results 
The same analysis as in Experiment 1 showed that when the proportion of congruent trials 
was manipulated in the stimulus list of the other participant, RTs on correct trials (99.4% of all trials) 
again showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,37) = 12.15, p = .001, reflecting shorter average 
responses on congruent trials (360ms) than on incongruent trials (371ms). Crucially, this main effect 
of congruency was modulated by the proportion congruency of the other participant, F(1,37) = 6.42, 
p = .015 (see Figure 3). The congruency effect of the participant receiving an equal proportion of 
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congruent and incongruent trials was 16ms, t(37) = 3.93, p < .001, when the other participant 
received 90% congruent trials. This effect dropped to 6ms when the other participant received 10% 
congruent trials, t(37) = 1.70, p = .09. Confirming Experiment 1, this suggests that participants are 
better at suppressing the interfering location information when the participant next to them exerts 
more effort. The main effect of proportion congruency of the other participant did not reach 
significance, p = .09, again showing that these results do not reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Because errors reflect responses to trials on which no stimulus was visible, the factor 
congruency and the interaction between congruency and irrelevant proportion are meaningless. 
Therefore, we only examined whether the number of errors was dependent upon on the proportion 
of congruent trials of the other participant, which was not the case, t(37) = 0.56, p = .57.   
For completeness, we also report the results when the proportion of congruent trials was 
manipulated in participant’s own stimulus list (see Table 1). RTs on correct trials (99.7% of all trials) 
showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,37) = 7.22, p = .01, which was modulated by the proportion 
of congruent trials, F(1,29) = 31.05, p < .001. Congruency effects were positive when 90% of the trials 
were congruent, 35ms, t(37) = 4.96, p < .001, and negative when 10% of the trials were congruent, -
11ms, t(37) = -2.28, p = .028. The main effect of proportion congruency did not reach significance, 
p > .10, showing that overall response speed was not different between both contexts. The error 
rates did not show differences between conditions, all p’s > .44. 
 
 
Fig 3. Results of Experiment 2 for the blocks in which participants received an equal 
proportion of congruent and incongruent trials, dependent on the proportion congruency of the 
other participant. Error bars reflect 95% within-subjects confidence intervals.  
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Table 1. 
Median RTs (error rates) as a function of congruency proportion and congruency, when the 
proportion of congruent trials was manipulated in the participant’s own stimulus list. Note that for 
Experiment 2, response errors are trials on which participants see a blank screen but nevertheless 
respond, so these cannot be classified as congruent/incongruent and are therefore not reported. 
 Congruency proportion Incongruent Congruent Difference 
Experiment 1 90% congruent 413 (2.63) 368 (1.13) 44.7 (1.50) 
 10% congruent 377 (1.42) 392 (1.64) -14.9 (-0.21) 
Experiment 2 90% congruent 397  362  35.2 
 10% congruent 364  375  -11.2 
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General Discussion 
In the current study, we started from the notion that the presence of another person can 
have a large influence on task performance. We extended this line of inquiry by showing that what 
the other person is doing can be of critical importance. In two experiments, two participants jointly 
performed a Simon task in which we selectively manipulated task difficulty for participant A only, by 
presenting this participant with either 90% congruent trials (creating an easy ask) or 10% congruent 
trials (creating a difficult task). Although this manipulation is irrelevant for the task performance of 
participant B, we nevertheless observed that participant B exerted more effort to ignore the 
irrelevant location information when participant A performed a difficult task (i.e., requiring much 
effort), compared to an easy task (i.e., requiring little effort). Crucially, in Experiment 2 this was 
found to be the case even when participants could see each other, but not each other’s stimuli. This 
result provides a straightforward demonstration that the exertion of mental effort can be contagious. 
In the remainder, we elaborate on the theoretical significance and underlying mechanisms of this 
phenomenon. 
Hitherto, the exertion of mental effort has repeatedly been linked to conflicts in information 
processing (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). For 
example, in the connectionist model of Botvinick and colleagues (2001), the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) is ascribed the function of a conflict monitor, which constantly monitors the information 
processing stream for conflicts. When two conflicting responses are simultaneously triggered, this 
will lead to a high level of conflict in the ACC. This, in turn, is believed to stimulate the cognitive 
control system, presumably located in dorsolateral PFC, to increase effort exertion in order to 
increase performance (Kerns et al., 2004). While this mechanistic explanation provides a 
comprehensive yet compact account of effort exertion (e.g., Shenhav et al., 2013), at current it does 
not allow effort exertion to be dependent on the behavior of another person’s presence. Because the 
degree of effort exerted by the person next to you does in no sense conflict with the task you are 
doing, the model would not predict that this  would influence your own level of effort exertion. More 
recent theoretical developments, on the other hand, increasingly aim to broaden the scope and 
antecedents of effort exertion, highlighting the role of motivation (Botvinick & Braver, 2014) and 
emotion (Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015) in cognitive control. As such, our findings add to these 
theoretical developments, by putting forth other person’s behavior as an important antecedent of 
cognitive control. Supporting the idea that we monitor the performance of other people, Sebanz and 
colleagues (2005) indeed found that participants actively represent the task rules of another person 
with whom they are performing a task. Two participants responded to different dimensions of the 
same stimulus (e.g., either color or direction), and the results showed that performance was reduced 
when a stimulus required a response from both participants. Taken together with the current results, 
we can thus conclude that there is clear evidence that participants both monitor what the other 
participant should do, and how the other participant is doing.  
In recent years, the view has emerged that the exertion of effort is computationally costly, 
and therefore humans tend to avoid mental effort when possible (Botvinick, 2007). When given the 
option, participants will avoid environments that demand high levels of effort, and instead prefer a 
low demanding alternative (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 
2013). Interestingly, the current results suggest that this default mode of avoiding mental effort is 
bound to certain preconditions. In our study, there were no incentives for exerting high or low levels 
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of effort, but nevertheless participants exert more mental effort when the person next to them was 
doing so. Thus, subtle effects of effort contagion, as observed in the current study, expose at least 
one of the boundaries within which people tend to avoid high effort.  
An undeniable prerequisite for contagious effort exertion is that people are capable of 
detecting differences in the amount of effort exerted by another person. Note that this was not done 
by simply observing the openly observable response speed of the other participant (as observed in 
previous research, see Huguet et al., 1999). In both experiments, when the congruency proportion 
was manipulated in the participant’s own stimulus list, congruency effects were markedly different 
between the condition with 10% vs. 90% congruent trials, whereas overall reaction times did not 
differ between both (i.e., there was no main effect of proportion of congruent trials). This shows that 
response speed of the other participant is not the source of the effect, but rather the actual degree 
of exerted effort. When exerting effort yourself, this is associated with increased heart rate, 
increased blood pressure, decreased heart-rate variability, and a perceived increase in arousal 
(Howells, Stein, & Russell, 2010; Peters et al., 1998; Smit, Eling, Hopman, & Coenen, 2005). However, 
to our knowledge, no study so far has examined how participants can perceive (physiological markers 
related to) the effort exerted by another person. One likely possibility is that participants infer the 
degree of effort based on subtle differences in the body posture. Effort exertion is linked to a more 
tense body posture and the adoption of such a posture also leads to an increased level of effort 
exertion (Friedman & Elliot, 2008). Expanding the limits, however, also more radical hypotheses 
should be considered, such as the possibility that effort exertion is influenced by a difference in scent 
of someone else exerting high or low effort (see e.g., Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005).  
Finally, apart from how we detect an increase in effort in another person, the question 
remains why we subsequently match our own degree of effort. After all, participants were always 
motivated to respond fast and accurate, so there is no incentive to match their degree of effort with 
that of the person next to them. As such, it could be that this does not reflect a truly deliberate 
decision, but instead a more automatic tendency to imitate people, as is the case with yawning 
(Senju et al., 2007), rubbing your face or shaking your foot (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and facial 
expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). Neurons that code for both the execution and the observation 
of actions (i.e., mirror neurons) have been proposed to underlie these forms of imitation (Iacoboni et 
al., 1999). However, it is unclear whether mirror neurons are able to fully account for the contagious 
nature of more high-level cognition. Therefore, more complex dynamics, beyond low-level motor 
imitation, might be at play. For example, people are very sensitive to how they are perceived by 
others and perceiving that the person next to them exerts much effort might motivate them to do 
the same (i.e., impression management; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Manipulating the task context, the 
task requirements and the instructions given, are promising fruitful avenues for further empirical 
inquiry. 
 
Conclusion 
In the current study, we showed for the first time that the exertion of mental effort is 
contagious. Simply performing a task next to a person who exerts much effort in a task will make you 
do the same. Our results extend literature on social facilitation, and raise several promising avenues 
for future investigation.  
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